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Abstract
We identify two issues in Chois (2010) paper on tying in two-sided markets published in
this Journal, and provide solutions to both of them. First, we point out that the equilibrium
in the absence of tying requires more restrictive conditions and does not satisfy a natural
equilibrium renement criterion. We o¤er an alternative timing structure that validates
the equilibrium derived in Choi (2010) under the conditions provided there. Second, we
show that his equilibrium analysis with tying ignores a protable deviation. We rectify this
analysis under our alternative timing structure and derive the (mixed-strategy) equilibrium
with tying. We also show by means of simulations that tying is welfare-enhancing whenever
it is protable, which is consistent with the main nding in Choi (2010).
1 Introduction
Choi (2010) - hereafter C10 - analyzes the e¤ects of tying in a two-sided market model that
allows multi-homing on both sides of the market. It is shown that multi-homing has important
implications for market competition and social welfare. In particular, tying can be welfare-
enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in
the absence of multi-homing. We identify two issues in C10s equilibrium analysis: one for
the equilibrium with multihoming on both sides of the platforms in the absence of tying and
the other for the equilibrium with tying. More specically, the analysis in C10 did not take
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into consideration particular deviations that could upset the equilibrium. To resolve these
issues, we o¤er an alternative timing structure of the game that would preserve the equilibrium
without tying derived in C10. We also provide the correct equilibrium analysis with tying under
this alternative timing assumption. Despite the errors in equilibrium characterizations, our
simulation results show that the main nding in C10 is still valid: tying is welfare-enhancing
whenever it is protable.
2 Setup and issues
2.1 Description of the setup in C10
We rst provide a brief description of the setup in C10 to facilitate our discussion and introduce
the model notation. There are two platforms indexed by i = A;B. Consumers and content
providers constitute two sides of the platforms. Let pi and qi denote platform is charge to
content providers and consumers, respectively. The corresponding number of content providers
and consumers who participate in platform i are denoted by mi and Ni, respectively.
The consumerschoice of platform is according to the Hotelling model of product di¤erenti-
ation with two platforms, A and B, being located at the end points of a line with length equal
to 1. Consumers can choose to either single-home or multi-home. If a consumer located at point
x participates in platform A only, his utility is given by uA(qA; x) = bmA   qA   tx while his
utility from participating in platform B is given by uB(qB; x) = bmB   qB   t(1  x); where t is
a transportationcost parameter. If the consumer decides to multi-home, his utility is given by
uAB(qA; qB; x) = bm  qA  tx  qB   t(1  x); where m is the total amount of content available
to consumers who multi-home. This amount is given by m = mA + mB    if the extent of
duplicative content across the platforms is .
On the content side, the total measure of content potentially available for each format is
normalized to 1. Among them, a proportion  is of the exclusivetype and can be encoded only
for a particular format whereas (1  ) is of the nonexclusivetype and can also be encoded in
the other format. When the nonexclusive type of content is encoded for both formats, content
providers are said to multi-home. Each content provider gains additional utility (prot) of 
from each consumer who has access to its content. The prot for content providers who create
content on platform i is thus given by ni   pi.
The existence of exclusive content available for each format creates incentives for con-
sumers to multi-home. With the possibility of multi-homing on the consumer side, let ni and
nM respectively denote the number of consumers who single-home on platform i and the num-
ber of consumers who multi-home, where i = A;B. Then, the total number of consumers who
participate in platform i is given by Ni = ni + nM .
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2.2 Issues
2.2.1 Equilibrium with multi-homing in the absence of tying
C10 implicitly assumes that platforms A and B set simultaneously (and independently) their
prices. More precisely, he considers the following timing:
1- Platforms A and B set their price pairs (pA; qA) and (pB; qB) simultaneously.
2- After observing these prices, consumers and content providers decide simultaneously to
join both platforms, one of them, or none.
In this section we show that this timing raises two problems: rst, the set of parameters
for which an equilibrium with multi-homing exists is smaller than what is stated in Proposition
1 in C10. Second, the existence of an equilibrium with multi-homing relies on an equilibrium
allocation of consumers and content providers (in the second stage) that violates a natural
renement criterion.
To see those issues, let us consider the symmetric equilibrium presented in C10, in which:
pi = p
 = 

1  b
2t

; qi = q
 =
b
2
; ni = n
 = 1  b
2t
; Ni = N
 =
b  q
t
=
b
2t
where i 2 fA;Bg. Note that non-exclusive content providers are then indi¤erent between single-
homing and multi-homing because pi = n

i .
Suppose now that platform A deviates from (p; q) to
 
pdA; q
d
A

with qdA < q
. Then the
mass of consumers NdA joining platform A is at least equal to
b qdA
t (unless the price p
d
A is so
high that platform As captive content producers choose not to join it, which would never be
optimal). As qdA < q
; it must be the case that NdA > N
: Therefore, the mass of consumers
single-homing at platform B, ndB = 1 NdA; is necessarily strictly less than n. This leads to
pB > n
d
B;
which implies that non-exclusive content providers do not multi-home.
The choice by non-exclusive content providers of the platform they single-home at depends
on the prices charged by the two platforms, and their anticipations of what consumers will do.
Consider the particular deviations with
 
p; qdA

where qdA is smaller but close to q
: Then, a
natural anticipation of content providers is that more consumers will join platform A (which is
undercutting platform B on the consumer side and o¤ering the same price on the other side).
With these anticipations, all non-exclusive content providers nd it optimal to single-home at
platform A. If consumers anticipate that, then there will be indeed more consumers joining
platform A. More precisely, there will be NdA = min

1;
b qdA
t

> N on platform A: Thus, there
exists an equilibrium allocation of content providers and consumers in the second stage such
that the considered unilateral deviation in the rst stage is strictly protable if qdA is su¢ ciently
close to q:
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The above second-stage equilibrium allocation satises the monotone allocation renement
criterion dened in Caillaud and Jullien (2003) but it need not be the only second-stage equi-
librium allocation following the rst-stage deviation. More precisely, the outcome in which all
non-exclusive content providers decide to single-home at platform B (because they anticipate
that the mass of consumers joining platform A will decrease), and more consumers join platform
B (because they anticipate that non-exclusive content providers single-home at platform B) can
also be an equilibrium outcome of the second stage. A necessary condition for the candidate
equilibrium constructed by C10 to be indeed an equilibrium is that the latter allocation, which
does not satisfy the monotone allocation requirement, is selected whenever it is an equilibrium
allocation of the second-stage subgame. When this is the case, a protable deviation by platform
A must ensure that this allocation (less favorable to A) is not an equilibrium allocation of the
second-stage subgame, which requires reducing qA by a large amount.
Denoting A3 the following condition:
min


2
; 1  

<

b
<

3 + 2
p
2

(1  ) ;
the reasoning above and Appendix A lead to the following statement:
Observation 1: In the absence of tying, the conditions stated for existence of an equilibrium
with multi-homing on both sides in C10 are incorrect. If, in addition to the conditions stated
there, condition A3 holds then there exists an equilibrium with multi-homing on both sides,
but this equilibrium does not satisfy the monotone allocation renement criterion dened in
Caillaud and Jullien (2003).
2.2.2 Equilibrium with multi-homing under tying
We identied another issue in the section of C10 analyzing the equilibrium with tying. There, it
is assumed that platform A is able to extract all content providerssurplus by setting a price 
for them, while platform B focuses on its captive (i.e., exclusive) content providers and charges
nB: This, however, ignores the fact that a non-exclusive content provider could decide to reduce
his reach and join platform B if the price of B is attractive enough. In particular, if platform B
deviates by charging a price slightly below nB on the content side, the non-exclusive content
providers would join platform B as this would allow them to get a (strictly) positive surplus.
Hence, platform B has a protable deviation. This leads to the following statement:
Observation 2: The equilibrium analysis with tying in C10 is incorrect as it ignores a prof-
itable deviation by platform B.
4
3 Solutions
3.1 Sequential timing
An alternative timing which is natural for the game considered by C10 is a sequential timing in
which content prices are chosen after consumers make their decisionsabout which platform(s) to
join (if any). Contrary to the simultaneous timing, the contination outcome is unique under the
sequential timing. Moreover, a natural extension of this timing turns out to be useful to address
the issue regarding the equilibrium analysis with tying.1
Consider the following timing for the game without tying:
0- Platform A sets the price qM of good M:
1- Platforms set their prices qA and qB on the consumer side.
2- Consumers decide whether to join both platforms, one of them, or none.
3- Platforms set their prices pA and pB on the content side.
4- Content providers decide whether to join both platforms, one of them, or none.2
It can be easily shown that the symmetric equilibrium outcome with multi-homing that leads
to Proposition 1 in C10 is an equilibrium outcome under this timing (and the same assumptions
A1 and A2). To see why, note rst that the reasoning in C10 rules out a protable unilateral
deviation in pA (or pB). Moreover, a deviation in qA under the timing above is less protable
than in C10 (and is therefore unprotable): if platform A undercuts platform B on the consumer
side, this has no e¤ect on platform As choice of pA but leads to a decrease in pB because of
the sequentiality in price setting, which makes the deviation prot smaller than that under the
simultaneous price-setting environment in C10.
Thus, the equilibrim outcome with multi-homing exhibited in C10 is an equilibrium outcome
under our sequential timing.
3.2 Analysis of Tying with Sequential Timing
To address this issue we consider a natural extension of the sequential timing above when the
platform ties both products, which is the following:
0- Platform A sets a price ~qM;A for the bundle.
1- If platform A decided to tie the two products in stage 1, platform B sets a price ~qB.
Otherwise, platforms set simultaneously their prices qA and qB on the consumer side.
2- Consumers decide whether to join both platforms, one of them, or none.
3- Platforms set their prices on the content side.
4- Content providers decide whether to join both platforms, one of them, or none.
1Both the simultaneous timing in C10 and our sequential timing are reasonable. The reason why we favor the
latter is that it is more convenient from a technical perspective.
2Each player is supposed to observe the actions of the agents who played in the previous stage(s) if any.
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3.2.1 Pricing on the content side
Consider the last stage of pricing (stage 3) assuming that all consumers buy the bundle. The
non-exclusive content providers never multi-home as platform A covers the whole population of
consumers. They choose between platforms A and B with respective prots
   pA and  ~NB   pB:
This leads to mixed strategies by platforms A and B. Let us consider a mixed strategy
equilibrium candidate with the distribution of platform Bs prices having possibly a mass point
at pB =  ~NB. Let Fi(:) denote platform is cumulative distribution of prices, where i = A;B. It
must hold that the upper bound of the distribution of the prices of platform A (resp. platform
B) is less than or equal to  (resp.  ~NB).
Then, the platformsexpected prots on the content side are given by
~cA = pAf+ (1  ))

1  FB

pA +  ~NB   

g
and
~cB = pBf1  (1  )FA

pB    ~NB + 

g
on their respective supports.
Platform Bs expected prot on the content side is
~cB =  ~NB:
The property of mixed strategy equilibrium requires that
pA +  ~NB   

f1  (1  )FA (pA)g =  ~NB:
As a result, we have
FA (pA) =
1
1  
 
pA +  ~NB       ~NB
pA +  ~NB   
!
on the support [   (1  ) ~NB; ]. Moreover, from
~cA =

pB    ~NB + 

f1  (1  )FB (pB)g
it follows that
FB (pB) =
1
1  
 
pB    ~NB +   cA
pB    ~NB + 
!
:
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The lower bound p
B
of the support of platform Bs prices must be such that
 ~NB   pB =    pA;
where p
A
=  (1  ) ~NB is the lower bound of the support of platform As prices. Therefore,
p
B
=  ~NB
Then, from FB

p
B

= 0, it follows that
~cA =    (1  ) ~NB:
Therefore,
FB (pB) =
1
1  
 
pB    ~NB
pB    ~NB + 
!
:
The value of this function at the upper bound of the support of platform Bs prices, i.e.  ~NB,
is3
FB

 ~NB

=
1
1  
 
 ~NB    ~NB

!
= ~NB < 1:
Hence, the distribution of prices of platform B has a mass of 1   ~NB at  ~NB: This completes
the characterization of the equilibrium of the pricing on the content side (stage 3).
Given ~NB; the probability that the non-exclusive content providers join platform B is


~NB

= Pr( ~NB   pB >    pA)
=
Z  ~NB
 ~NB

1  FA

pB    ~NB + 

fB (pB) dpB
= ~NB  
Z  ~NB
 ~NB
FA

pB    ~NB + 

fB (pB) dpB;
where
fB (pB) = F
0
B (pB) =
1
1  
    ~NB +  ~NB
pB +     ~NB
2 :
Then,


~NB

= ~NB  

h
1 

1  ) ~NB
i
(1  )2
Z  ~NB
 ~NB
 
pB    ~NB
pB
!
1
pB +     ~NB
2dpB:
3More precisely, this is sup
n
FB (pB)j pB <  ~NB
o
.
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The computations in Appendix B show that this probability can be rewritten as


~NB

= ~NB   1
(1  )2
 
1 +
 ~NB
1  ~NB
!(
1  
~NB
1  ~NB
ln
 
1  (1  ) ~NB

!)
:
3.2.2 Pricing on the consumer side
Consider now platform Bs choice of ~qB at stage 1, which determines the mass of consumers ~NB
joining platform B at stage 2: For a given ~NB, the incremental value that a consumer located
at x derives from joining platform B is b + (1  ) b

~NB

  t(1   x): Therefore, the price
charged to consumers by platform B is related to ~NB as follows:
~qB = b+ (1  ) b

~NB

  t ~NB:
We can therefore write platform Bs prot as a function of ~NB:
~B = ~qB ~NB + ~
c
B =
h
b+ (1  ) b

~NB

  t ~NB + 
i
~NB:
Di¤erentiating the latter with respect to ~NB gives the equation dening the equilibrium mass
~NB of consumers joining platform B:
2t ~NB =  (b+ ) + (1  ) b
h


~NB

+ 0

~NB

~NB
i
:
The corresponding equilibrium price on the consumer side is
~qB =
b+ (1  ) b

~NB

     (1  ) b0

~NB

~NB
2
:
Remark : The expressions in C10 can be derived from the expressions above by replacing


~NB

by 0 (i.e. all non-exclusive content providers go to platform A) and 0

~NB

by 0
(because in Chois timing consumers do not join platforms before platforms set their prices on
the content side).
3.2.3 Pricing of the bundle
The lowest expected consumer utility is obtained by the marginal consumer located at x = 1  ~NB
and is equal to (when not including the price of the bundle):
~U = v + b  (1  ) b

~NB

  t

1  ~NB

= v + b (1 + )  t  ~qB:
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Thus, under tying, platform A sets the price of the bundle to
~qM;A = ~U
 = v + b (1 + )  t  ~qB
assuming that v is high enough for the tying platform to nd it optimal to sell the bundle to all
consumers.
3.2.4 Incentives for tying
Platform As equilibrium (overall) prot under tying is
~M = v + b (1 + )  t  ~qB +     ~NB +  ~NB   cM :
Since platform As equilibrium prot without tying is
M = v + b  t+    
b
2t
+
(b)2
4t
  cM
we have
~M  M = b  ~qB    ~NB +  ~NB +
b
2t
  (b)
2
4t
=
b
2
+

2
+
b
2t
  (b)
2
4t
  (1  )
0@b

~NB

  0

~NB

~NB
2
+  ~NB
1A
while the corresponding di¤erence between prots in C10 is
b
2
+

2
+
b
2t
  (b)
2
4t
:
An analytical comparison of ~M and 

M is much more complicated than in C10s analy-
sis because ~NB does not have a closed-form expression in our setting. We therefore perform
simulations at the end of our analysis to determine the set of parameters under which tying is
protable.
3.2.5 Welfare analysis
Social welfare (net of v) under tying is
~W =
n
(1  ~NB)
h
+ (1  )

1  

~NB
i
+ ~NB (1 + )
o
b
 
 Z 1  ~NB
0
txdx+ t ~NB
!
+
h
+  ~NB + (1  )

1  

~NB

+ 0

~NB

~NB
i

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while in the absence of tying social welfare is given by
W = (1 + nM) b 
"Z 1 NA
0
txdx+
Z 1 NB
0
txdx+ tnM
#
+ [ (NA +N

B) + 1  ]
where NA = N

B =
b
2t and n

M =
b
t   1:
Again, the analytical comparison of social welfare with and without tying is very complicated,
which requires us to run simulations.
3.2.6 Simulations
We now compute the e¤ect of tying on prots ~M  M and its e¤ect on social welfare ~W  W
for a large number of discrete parameter values in the set dened by assumptions A1 and A2.
More precisely, we normalize b to 1 (without any loss of generality) and consider values of , 
and t such that
 2 (0; 1)
 2

0;
2 (1  )


t 2

 [ + 2 (1 + )]
4
; 

:
The graph below shows the e¤ects of tying on prots and welfare. Blue (resp., black) depicts
the combinations of parameter values such that the e¤ects of tying on welfare and prots are
positive (resp., negative), while red depicts the combinations of parameter values such that
socially desirable tying does not occur in equilibrium because it is not protable. The graph
shows that there are parameter values for which tying is not protable, while C10 nds that
tying is always protable under assumptions A1 and A2. However, we do not nd any parameter
values for which tying is both protable and welfare-detrimental. In other words, if platform A
engages in tying, this always increases social welfare, which is consistent with the main message
of C10.4
4 Conclusion
We identify two issues in C10s analysis of tying in two-sided markets with multi-homing, and
o¤er a solution to both of them based on an alternative timing. After correcting the two errors
we nd that, while tying is not always protable, the main message in C10 remains correct
under our alternative timing: with multi-homing on both sides, tying improves social welfare
whenever it is protable.
4The details of our simulation results are available upon request.
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A Appendix: Existence of an equilibrium with multi-homing
under simultaneous pricing
Assume that after a deviation by platform A; the continuation equilibrium where all non-
exclusive content providers single-home at platform B prevails if it exists. In that case, the
mass of consumers on platform A and B respectively would be
N^dA =
b  qdA
t
and N^dB =
b  q
t
:
However, platform A can ensure (by charging content providers a price low enough) that this
allocation is not an equilibrium allocation. For this to happen, it must be the case that
N^dB   p  N^dA   pdA
that is,
pdA  

1  b(1  )
t
  q
d
A
t

:
Platform A then nds it optimal to choose
pdA = 

1  b(1  )
t
  q
d
A
t

11
and to choose the value of qdA that maximizes its prot
pdA + q
d
AN
d
A = 

1  b(1  )
t
  q
d
A
t

+ qdA
b  qdA
t
= qdA
 
b     qdA

t
+ 

1  b(1  )
t

subject to the constraint qdA < q
. With a slight abuse of notation (due to an openness problem)
that could be avoided at the cost of a longer exposition, the optimal deviation price on the
consumer side is given by
qdA =
(
q    if b  1  
b 
2 otherwise
:
Then the optimal deviation prot (or, more rigorously the limit of the deviation prots when
  ! 0) is given by
dA =
8<:
b2
2t
 
1  2

+ 

1  b2t   (1 )bt

if b  1  
(b )2
4t + 

1  (1 )bt

otherwise
:
We need to compare this deviation prot to the equilibrium prot
A =
b2
4t
+ 

1  b
2t

:
Straightforward computations show that, for b  1  ,
b2
2t

1  
2

+ 

1  b
2t
  (1  )b
t

> A ()

b
<

2
and, for b > 1  ,
(b  )2
4t
+ 

1  (1  )b
t

> A ()

b
>

3 + 2
p
2

(1  ) :
Therefore, the considered deviation is not protable if and only if
min


2
; 1  

<

b
<

3 + 2
p
2

(1  ) :
For the candidate equilibrium with muti-homing derived by C10 to be indeed an equilibrium, it
must hold that the above condition is satised, in addition to the conditions A1 and A2 dened
in C10.5
5A1 stipulates that b  d > t and A2 stipulates that [+2b(1 )]
4
 t.
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B Appendix: Computation of 

~NB

We have


~NB

= ~NB  

h
1 

1  ) ~NB
i
(1  )2
Z  ~NB
 ~NB
 
pB    ~NB
pB
!
1
pB +     ~NB
2dpB
| {z }
I
:
We can rewrite I as
I =
Z  ~NB
 ~NB
0B@ 1
pB +     ~NB
2    ~NB
pB

pB +     ~NB
2
1CA dpB:
Using the following decomposition in irreducible rational fractions
 ~NB
pB

pB +     ~NB
2 =  ~NB
    ~NB
2
264 1
pB
  1
pB +     ~NB
     
~NB
pB +     ~NB
2
375 ;
we can derive
I =
Z  ~NB
 ~NB
8><>:
 
1 +
 ~NB
    ~NB
!
1
pB +     ~NB
2 +  ~NB
    ~NB
2  1pB +     ~NB   1pB
9>=>; dpB
=
1
    ~NB
Z  ~NB
 ~NB
8><>:

h
1 

1  ) ~NB
i

pB +     ~NB
2 +  ~NB1  ~NB

1
pB +     ~NB
  1
pB
9>=>; dpB:
From Z  ~NB
 ~NB
1
pB +     ~NB
2dpB = 1

1
1  (1  )nB

Z  ~NB
 ~NB
1
pB +     ~NB
dpB = ln   ln ~NB +     ~NB =   ln h1  (1  ) ~NBi
Z  ~NB
 ~NB
1
pB
dpB =   ln
it follows that
I =
1


1  ~NB
 (1   ~NB
1  ~NB
ln
 
1  (1  ) ~NB

!)
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We thus have


~NB

= ~NB  
h
1 

1  ) ~NB
i
(1  )2

1  ~NB
 (1   ~NB
1  ~NB
ln
 
1  (1  ) ~NB

!)
= ~NB   1
(1  )2
 
1 +
 ~NB
1  ~NB
!(
1  
~NB
1  ~NB
ln
 
1  (1  ) ~NB

!)
:
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